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This paper looks into the struggle between Islam and politics in Indonesia from 
Soekarno-era up to the Reform. So far, Islam in Indonesia has been known as 
unique because of its history. When Islam entered Indonesia, it was mystical in 
nature, accommodating towards local religion and culture that existed before its 
arrival. In the wake of the emergence of the nation-State concept in this modern 
age, the struggle between Islam and politics in Indonesia tends to be characterized 
by the presence dialectic that continues to take place, i.e. whether Islam should 
adopted as the sole ideology and the state positive law of the country or on the con-
trary where it should become the ethics and values in the spirit of the nation and 
State. This indicates that the struggle between Islam and politics in Indonesia is 
not static, but rather it tends to be dynamic and volatile as it is strongly affected 
by changes in the political landscape in each era of Government.
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INTRODUCTION 
It is undeniable that Islam is one of the largest religions in the world today. Its 
adherents spread from Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe to the Americas. The 
growth of  the  Muslims  “concentration  camp”  in  numerous countries  of 
course could not be separated from the rapid progress of globalization marked 
by advances in science and technology, so as to facilitate access and shorten the 
distance between  one country and  another. So far,  when talking  about 
Islam, we generally  tend to  think of  the Middle East  or  the Arab world, 
due to the  history  of the arrival of Islam.  However, the reality shows that 
the largest number of Muslims in the world is not found in the Middle East, 
but rather  in  Southeast Asia, including in  Indonesia  where  88.2 percent of 
its 235 million inhabitants is Muslim.
This article covers the issue of Islam in Indonesia. I hope this piece of writing will 
enrich the study of Islam in the country as there is a tendency that shows that the 
study of Islam in  Indonesia  has not been of interest to  scholars  because it 
is still  often regarded as  ‘peripheral Islam’   or  ‘impure Islam’.  This happens 
because  the geographic  location of  Indonesia  is  far  from the heart of  the 
[  102  ]
AL ALBAB - Borneo Journal of Religious Studies (BJRS) Volume 4 Number 1 June 2015
Islamic tradition in the Arab lands. This article will describe a brief history of 
Islam in  Indonesia  and  will also discuss the complexity and  the dynamics 
of the relationship between Islam and politics in the country from Soekarno-
era to the reform.
THE HISTORY OF THE ARRIVAL OF ISLAM IN INDONESIA
Talking about the history of Islam in Indonesia is not something simple, but 
rather  quite complex  as there are  different versions  about the history and 
development of  early  Islam.  According to  Sunanto  (2005: 8-9)  there are 
at least  three public  opinions  depicting  the early history  of Islam in  the 
archipelago.  The first opinion argued that  Islam  came to  Indonesia  in the 
7th century  from Gujarat  (India) as evidenced by  the discovery of  the first 
Islamic sultan’s tomb, Malik al-Salih who reportedly came from Gujarat. This 
opinion was  put forward by  the Dutch orientalist  scholars such as  Snouck 
Hurgronje. A second opinion  was suggested by  Muslim  scholars, such 
as Hamka and his friends who had the initiative to hold a “Seminar on the 
history  of the arrival of Islam  to  Indonesia”  in  1963. Hamka  and his 
colleagues argued that  Islam had existed  in  Indonesia around  the 7th until 
8th century and was brought directly from Arabia. They thought so because 
according to them the international sea route had been crowded before the 
13th century through  the Malacca Strait  which connects  with  the Tang 
dynasty in East Asia, Srivijaya in Southeast Asia, and the Umayyad dynasty in 
Western Asia.
The third  opinion  was suggested by  the famous  historian  Taufik  Abdullah 
who tried to synthesize  both  of the previous  opinions.  According to 
him, Islam had indeed arrived in Indonesia in the 7th century, but was adopted 
by the merchants of the Middle East around the harbor. The Islamic religion 
entered the region and had the political power in the late 13th century marked 
by the establishment of Samudera Pasai. The founding of the Kingdom could 
not be separated from the Abbasid Dynasty collapse in Baghdad. This would 
later forced Muslim traders to move their trading activities to East Asia, South 
Asia, and Southeast Asia.
On the other hand, in  that  century,  a lot of turmoil and warfare also took 
place in the Middle East, including  the Crusades,  so that  residents in  the 
region  chose  to sail to  the area  considered  more secure,  i.e. Southeast 
Asia.  While in  the area,  some of them  married the locals.  Gradually, 
from  this process,  the  Muslim  communities  in the area of  the trade  ports 
in the archipelago  (Hadi.W.M, 2006: 446). The Mongol  invasion  in  the 
Muslim lands of in other parts of the Middle East  in the 13th century also 
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encouraged people of the Middle East doing a massive exodus to India and 
Southeast Asia.  The  Exodus  took place  until  the 14th century following 
the hectic flow of shipping and trade. Along with traders and refugees, also 
present were a number of sufis and their followers. The sufis later helped the 
spread of Islam in the archipelago.
The Malay Archipelago is one of the leading gateways, thus becoming the nearest 
transit point for foreign ships from the West. In addition, the ports around Ma-
lacca such as Perlak and Samudera Pasai were also frequently visited by trad-
ers. The traders  lived in such places  for quite a long time. At that moment, 
there was intermingling  between  traders  from various  nations and  local 
people. They were introduced to the customs, culture, and religion (read: Is-
lam). Among  the  traders, the  Arabs, Persians and  Gujaratis  were  generally 
Muslim.  They  introduced  the Islamic  religion and culture  to fellow  traders 
and local residents. The Archipelago’s residents gradually embraced the reli-
gion. Islam was increasingly growing because Muslim traders also established 
close relations by marrying other traders and also the local people, causing 
the  emergence of ‘concentration  camps’  for  Muslim  traders  in the coastal 
region. Since then, the local residents who had converted to Islam, and with 
the spirit of the religion, spread to their family and relatives, so Islam eventu-
ally grew into a popular religion.
This continued for many years until the emergence of Islamic communities that 
were solid,  which later  formed the  first Islamic Kingdom in the 
Archipelago  named  Pasai  with its King,  Malik al-Saleh.  It was the  first 
Islamic  Kingdom  in  Indonesia  and  was also  the  forerunner of the  birth of 
the other Islamic kingdoms in the Archipelago. Islam became a religion that 
developed in  Pasai  at that time  because Hindu-Buddhism experienced  a 
downturn  following  the fall of Buddhist  Kingdom which had 
long  controlled the  trade routes  of Southeast Asia, namely the Kingdom 
of Srivijaya  in the early  13th century.  The  setback  resulted in  shrinking 
regions  the power  of Srivijaya.  Several  small kingdoms  in Sumatra  that 
were originally controlled  by  Srivijaya,  managed to  break away  such 
as Lamuri, Aru, Pedir, Samalangga, Samudra on the East Coast, and Barus on 
the West Coast. At the end of the 13th century, the Kingdom of Pasai managed 
to  unite the various  small kingdoms  which  broke away from the  former 
Kingdom of Srivijaya and then  sent  trade envoys to China to announce  its 
sovereignty. Finally, the Pasai came as the Kingdom that could rival the success 
of Srivijaya.
In the middle of 13th century, there was a massive invasion by the Kingdom of 
Majapahit on Srivijaya and Pasai. The invasion severely weakened the power 
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of Srivijaya,  so that  the authority of  the Government was  losing its grip.  In 
contrast, the invasion of Majapahit failed to destabilize Pasai. Pasai still showed its 
power as the main trader in the Strait of Malacca. Although Pasai had been 
defeated by  Majapahit  but  it did not  fully  bring  grief  to  Pasai, instead  it 
brought  blessings to  the development of Islam  in the archipelago since  the 
prisoners  of Pasai  Kingdom were taken to East Java -which was the  center 
of  the Majapahit Kingdom  located in  Ampel  Denta  and  Ampel  Gading, 
Surabaya.  Gradually, the place was  transformed into  a  centre of  the spread 
of Islam in Java and later gave birth to various walis (spreaders) of Islam. The 
inter-marriage  between the  descendants of Majapahit  and  Pasai was 
increasingly  pushing more people  to move to the  East Java  and made the 
Islamization process grow rapidly.
At the end of  the 14th century,  the last King of Sriwijaya, 
Paramesywara intended to restore his Kingdom and also took revenge of his 
defeat of Majapahit. However, Srivijaya was helpless against Majapahit.  It was 
destroyed by Majapahit, so Paramesywara and his family, relatives, clergymen, 
and loyalists were forced to fled to Temasik (Singapore) and later moved to 
Malacca  which at that time  was known  as  a  flourishing  trade  and  transit 
point  for travelers  from different parts of  the world.  At the 
venue, Paramesywara intended to set up a new kingdom in order to restore 
his authority.  Finally  the Kingdom of  Malacca  then  appeared to be  the 
second  Islamic kingdom  in  Nusantara  (the Indonesian Archipelago) 
after  Pasai.  The emergence of  the Kingdom of  Malacca which was an 
Islamic Kingdom could not be  separated from  the help of  Paramesywara 
who was married to  the Princess  of Pasai  and  later  he converted to 
Islam. Rapid  development  of Islam in the  Archipelago  is inseparable 
from  an egalitarian  character.  Islam  knows  no  caste  or clergy  system 
which by  religions before Islam was believed to be an intermediary  tool  to 
communicate with  God.  In addition,  the existence of  Islamic  educational 
institutions  concentrated  on  teaching how to write and read  in order 
to develop an intellectual tradition also attracted the people to convert to the 
religion because by mastering literacy, they could raise the standard of living 
and social status.
After  developing  in  the areas around the trading ports,  the  spreaders  of 
Islam  were increasingly  expanding  their mission  by  venturing  to 
other  coastal areas  and  the countryside.  At this stage the traders, assisted 
by  the  sufi  (wali) and  supported by  local  authorities,  played an important 
role  in the process of  Islamization.  The  Islamization  process  was  relatively 
quick due to  the selected  propagation  approach  of  Sufism.  The pattern 
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of sufism basically  is more suitable  for a  society that  is still  heavily 
influenced by Hindu-Buddhist  asceticism  and  syncretism  of local 
belief.  The pattern of  Sufism  also  tends to be very  tolerant of  the practice 
of  traditional  Islamic  doctrine  that tends to  be a little  strict.  The process 
of  Islamization  also  spread rapidly  in  Indonesia  because the process 
of spreading was not  through military  invasion, so that  the transition from 
Hindu-Buddhism to Islam took place naturally without any sharp friction.
The use of  art  media  in the spread of  Islam  was another attraction  in 
the spread of  Islam in the  Indonesian Archipelago, so  the Islamic  in 
Indonesia is regarded as  unique by many scholars.  The  Wali  Songo  (the 
Nine Guardians) in Java used this strategy in the spread of Islam. The 15th 
century Persian  historian,  Zainuddin Al-Ma’bari  who lived quite a long 
time in Malabar  said that  many people  of South  India  and the  Indonesian 
Archipelago converted to Islam  after hearing  the stories of  Prophet 
Muhammad  that were presented  in the form of  poetry  and songs, such 
as Kasidah  Burdah,  Syaraful  Anam, Syair  Rampai  Maulid,  especially 
on the birthday of the Prophet  (Hadi.W.M, 2006: 454).  This  was exactly 
the  medium  used by the Walis  in Java and  other groups of Sufis  in the 
spread of  Islam, such as  reading out  Rawatib  Shaykh  Samman,  Rawatib 
Shyekh Abdul Qadir Jaelani, etc.
With a  large number  of kingdoms  transformed  into  the Islamic 
Kingdom, intellectual tradition  characterized  the Kingdoms marked 
by  the emergence of  the Muslim  intellectuals, such as Hamzah Fanzuri, 
Samsuddin Sumatrani,  Nurudin  al-Raniri and  Abd.  Rauf  Singkel in Aceh, 
Wali Songo in the Kingdom of Demak. Later, the Royal Palace then provided the 
mosque and  madrasa  as a centre for  education and training  for  the  da’is 
(Islamic proselytizers)  that became  the spreaders  of Islam  throughout 
the country. The proselytization was done with simple and easy to understand 
language, so they  easily  made other people  interested  in  Islam. Starting 
from  Pasai, and then  spread to  other areas  in the archipelago,  the Islamic 
Kingdoms  were increasingly  emerging, especially  after  the  kings  embraced 
the religion and was then  followed by the people. In the 16th-17th  century 
came the  Kingdoms of  Demak, Pajang, Mataram,  Banten, Cirebon,  and 
Madura.  In  the 16th century, the Kingdom of  Ternate-Tidore emerged 
in Ambon. In the 17th century, the Kingdoms of Buton, Selayar, Gowa, Tallo in 
Sulawesi, Bima and Lombok in Nusa Tenggara, and Pontianak and Banjarmasin 
in Kalimantan. In the 18th century, in the Malay Archipelago, grew a variety 
of  Islamic  kingdoms  following the  decline of the  Aceh Kingdom, such 
as Palembang, Johor, Riau, Minangkabau, etc. (Hadi W.M., 2006: 459). In later 
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development,  these  Islamic  kingdoms  played an active role  in the  struggle 
to expel the invaders as inspired by the teachings of jihad which is against all 
forms of oppression.
 
ISLAM IN THE ERA OF SUKARNO
During the administration of Sukarno, there was a lot of debate  about the 
relationship between Islam and politics. The founding fathers were engaged 
in  a  long debate  about the form of  the State.  The  debate  lasted  from  the 
late 1930s  until  1965. It involved  the  secular-nationalist groups (religion-
neutral  nationalist) and  the Islamic-nationalist circles.  The secular 
nationalists, represented by Sukarno and consisted of the Muslims and other 
religious adherents, argued that nationalism should be the cornerstone and the 
prime mover for the people to achieve independence. Nationalism according 
to  Sukarno  is the  embodiment of the  sense of love  on Homeland  and 
willingness to leave the narrow interests for the sake of realizing the interests 
of the nation. Then, to unite the people of Indonesia in an effective manner, 
nationalism  must  be highly upheld. (Anwar:  2006;  759).  The  secular-
nationalist had the opinion that  making  Indonesia  an  Islamic State  is 
similar to looking down on  other believers  and  making them  second-
class citizens (Madjid, 2010: 4).
The Islamic-nationalist circles  represented by  Ahmad  Hassan,  Agus 
Salim,  and M.Natsir  were  not  in line with  the opinion of  the  secular-
nationalist  and criticized  the concept of  Sukarno’s  nationalism  because 
it was considered  as a form of  chauvinism  and supported  the spirit 
of tribalism (‘ashabiyah), something which is strictly prohibited in Islam. They 
also  criticized Sukarno’s nationalism because it was considered a reduction 
of  the role  of religion in the  public sphere.  They  proposed the  importance 
of Islamic  principles  to  guard the goals  of nationalism  (Anwar, 2006:  759-
60).  However, Sukarno  criticized  the  Islamic-nationalist  back with  an 
argument that nationalism did not have to be under Islam. He remained consistent 
with the separation of religion and the State and did not agree with formalism 
of Islam in the country. According to him, Islam should serve as a fire, spirit, 
soul of the state (Sukarno, 1959: 452-53).
Seeing  the heat of  the debate  that continued to  occur  among the  secular-
nationalist and the religious-nationalist ahead of independence, Sukarno did 
a  compromise  of the various  ideological  tendencies  at that time.  Sukarno 
then introduced Pancasila  (the Five Basic Principles) that  consists of  the 
values of  the divinity, humanity, nationalism, democracy, and  social 
justice. On 5 June 1945, which is considered the day of the birth of Pancasila, 
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Sukarno delivered a speech in front of BPUPKI (Governing Body of Efforts 
for Preparation  of Indonesia’s Independence ) in order to explain in detail of 
his ideas.
On 22 July 1945, Pancasila finally found  the most perfect concept with the 
formulation of Indonesia’s Declaration of Independence, known as the Charter 
of Jakarta,  which later  became the  preamble of  the 1945  Constitution.  The 
content  of  the  Jakarta  Charter  comprise  (1)  the Divinity,  with the 
obligation of observing Islamic jurisprudence for the its followers; (2) a just 
and  civilized humanity;  (3) the  unity of  Indonesia;  (4)  democracy led by 
wisdom in deliberation of the representatives;  (5)  social justice  for  all the 
people of  Indonesia.  The  Charter was  signed by  nine  prominent  figures  in 
those days, eight  of whom were  Muslim, such as Sukarno, 
Mohammad  Hatta,  Abikusno  Tjokrosujoso,  Abdul  Kahar  Muzakkir,Agus 
Salim,  Achmad  Subardjo, Wahid  Hasyim, Muhammad  Yamin,  and a 
Christian named A.A. Maramis. A logical consequence of the phrase ‘Islamic 
jurisprudence’ in the first principle shows that Islamic law will be observed by 
the State.
When Indonesia gained independence  on 17  August 1945, Sukarno and 
Hatta  declared  the proclamation of  the independence of  Indonesia.  At  the 
moment, they did not read out the Pancasila text content. Instead, they read 
a new document called the text of the proclamation. The next day on August 
18, 1945, when a meeting of the PPKI (Indonesia’s independence Preparatory 
Committee)  was held to formulate  a  Constitution,  an importance issue 
emerged  in which the  Christian group  that came from  the North Sulawesi 
province wanted to break away from Indonesia if the seven words (with the 
obligation of observing Islamic jurisprudence for its followers) in Jakarta were 
not omitted.
Before  removing the  seven words  in  Jakarta,  Hatta  consulted  in 
advance with  two  leading Islamic  figures,  i.e.  Muhammad  Hasan 
and Kasman Singodimejo. Hatta also had a political compromise with the Ki 
Bagus Hadikusumo because during that time, the latter was known as one of 
the prominent Islamic figures who insisted on the seven words to be included 
in the Jakarta Charter.  After going through quite a long process, eventually 
the  seven words were  removed,  with a note that  the contents of  the 
first  sila (principle)  of the Pancasila  as set forth  in the Constitution  1945 
was  added  with the  phrase ‹Almighty’,  so that it becomes  “One Supreme 
God”. The addition of the phrase ‘One Supreme God’ was a compensation for 
the  abolition of the  seven words  and  still contains substantially  the quality 
of monotheistic (oneness of God), which is the essence of the teaching of Islam.
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The ideological debate about the form of the state had not completely ended after 
the  political compromise  that  led to  the omission  of the seven  words in 
the  Jakarta Charter. There were still parties that were not  satisfied with  the 
replacement of  the seven words. They assumed that the replacement of the 
first principle was another form of compromise between them and the secular 
group.  It was then  dragged  the Government  to  establish  a compromise  by 
founding a Religious Affairs Ministry  led by  a Muslim,  who  is in charge 
of guaranteeing the freedom of each worshipper to observe his/her faith.
The presence of  the Ministry of Religious Affairs brought discontent  to  the 
Christians because of  this Ministry  was regarded as  another form 
of  consciousness  that implicitly  said  that Islam is the  State religion of  the 
Republic of  Indonesia. In addition,  the Department is  only considered  as 
a way  to fight the  State  concept  of Pancasila.  T.B.  Simatupang  was 
a fictional character  who  criticized  the  concept of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs.  According to him, the Department of  Religion  was 
more suitable  to be replaced with  the Ministry of  Religious Affairs  as the 
term  only  referred to  one specific religion, so Islam  was the only  religion 
that was truly cared for. Meanwhile, Department of Religious Affairs means a 
Department which protects and recognizes all religions in Indonesia, without 
placing a religion superior to others.
The Islamic-nationalist’s  resolve  to restore  the content of  the Jakarta  char-
ter that failed did not stop after the independence on 18 August 1945. They still 
made every political effort to reinstate the Charter during a Constituent As-
sembly in 1959 in Jakarta. However, the secular nationalists also remained un-
changed to the Jakarta Charter in which the seven words should be exclud-
ed. Each party was so consistent with its stand, so that the Constituent Assembly 
ran into a stalemate. Despite the voting system, it would still be difficult  to 
give  a way out  because there was no  party that  managed to  hold  ¾  of the 
votes  or 67%.  The Islamic groups  only secured  44%, whereas  the Pancasi-
la groups only 56%. Upon looking at the endless debate, Sukarno finally of-
fered a proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution. At first, the Constituent 
Assembly did not accept the proposal of President Sukarno, but with the help 
of the Armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI), Sukarno issued the 
Presidential Decree  on 5 July  1959.  The contents  of the decree  are 1)  the 
dissolving of  the Constituent Assembly, 2)  returning to the  1945 Constitu-
tion and to revoke the Temporary Constitution and 3) establishing the Provi-
sional People’s Consultative Assembly consisting of members of the House of 
Representatives plus Regional Representatives as well as the establishing the 
temporary Supreme Consultative Council.
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With the  issuance of  the Decree,  Sukarno  declared  the birth  of the period 
of Guided Democracy with the support of Nasakom (Nationalist, Communist, 
and  religious group), each of which  consisted of  the National  Party 
of Indonesia (PNI), the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and the Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU).  After the inception of  Guided  Democracy,  Sukarno’s 
leadership  turned out to be  authoritarian and  showed no tolerance 
toward criticism.  Sukarno’s increasingly  authoritarian  attitude had 
caused the Masyumi  to criticize  him.  However, Masyumi’s criticism 
was  regarded by  Sukarno as  an effort to  obstruct his will.  The inclusion 
of  several Masyumi  members, such as  Natsir,  Syarifuddin Prawinegara, 
and  Burhanuddin Harahap  into the  Revolutionary Government  of the 
Republic of  Indonesia  (PRRI), a  rebel movement  in West Sumatra  in 1958, 
made Sukarno  increasingly  upset  about  Masyumi.  Finally,  in  August 1960, 
Sukarno  issued PenPres  No.  200/1960  to urge  the leadership  of the Party 
to dissolve itself.  Finally, on 13 September  1960  the Masyumi  party  was 
officially disbanded (Sunanto, 2005: 72).
The rebellion  carried out by the PRRI  and another by  DI/TII  in 
several areas  in  Indonesia,  prompted  Sukarno  to take an initiative  to 
quell the uprising with the help of the Armed Forces. After successfully crushing 
the PRRI and DI/TII, ABRI’s popularity was increasing, so its presence was taken 
into account in  the political  scene  of the country.  Sukarno  felt threatened, 
so he  embraced  the PKI  to strengthen  his political position  in order 
to counterbalance the power of  the Armed Forces because the PKI was the 
only force outside of the Armed Forces that had a significant political force at 
that time. Not long after that, in various areas in Indonesia, there was a variety 
of mess that was allegedly masterminded by the PKI and reached its peak in 
the events that killed several high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces.
The occurrence of  G30S (event  that killed  several high-ranking 
officers of  the Armed Forces allegedly by the PKI) then  triggered the birth 
of outrage  among  the masses  in various regions  in  Indonesia.  Various 
elements, such as the  Ansor  Youth (NU),  the Muhammadiyah Youth, and 
various  other  Islamic organizations, supported by  the Armed Forces  side 
by side cracked down against the PKI (Sunanto, 2005: 75). This event was the 
culmination of Guided Democracy in the age of ideological conflict. Sukarno’s 
dream  to establish  a peaceful and dignified  Government was  only in 
dreams. In 1966, after going through a variety of crucial events, Sukarno was 
finally  removed from Presidency. A number of high-ranking officers of the 
Armed Forces  at the time  urged  Sukarno to  hand over  his position to  the 
Supreme Commander of  ABRI, Suharto,  through  the Supersemar  (March 
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11 Decree)  for the sake of restoring  social  order  and  security  (Sunanto, 
2005: 76; Hefner, 2002: 388).
After  the rise  of Suharto  as President, he  put down  all the  things re-
lated to  PKI  (read: the Communists).  He  boycotted  the whole  books 
that  had  affinity  with the teachings of  communism.  He also  excommuni
cated  and  withdrew  their political  rights  of  those related to the  PKI.  The 
entire  population was forced to  convert to  the official religions,  and as the 
communists  were identified  as atheists, most people who were adher-
ents of  belief  (which is considered  not  religious)  eventually converted  to 
Christianity because they worried about being associated as part of the Com-
munist (Mujiburrahman, 2001: 30).
Some  Islamic  circles  called the ‘abangan’ Muslims, who had 
been  sympathetic  to  the Communist Party of  Indonesia  (PKI),  also did  a 
massive conversion to Christianity and some to Hinduism (even though the 
number was insignificant). In the period from 1965 to 1971, it was reported that 
around 2,000,000 ‘abangan’ Muslims were baptized into Christianity (Azra: 2002: 
213). Followers of the traditional belief and the ‹abangan› Muslims preferred 
to convert to Christianity because they were ‘fed up’ with various radical and 
barbaric  actions often done  by various  Muslim groups  against  communist 
sympathizers after the fall of Sukarno from presidency (Hefner: 2002: 391).
The massive  conversion  of Muslims  to Christianity also caused the  two 
religious groups involved  in tensions.  According to the  Boland,  Islamic 
circles  regarded  Christian  faith  as  superstitious,  illogical while Christians 
considered the faith of  the Muslims as  fanatical and backward (Azra, 2002: 
213). The tension did not stop there, and both were still involved in the conflict at the 
end of 1967 in which some Muslim youth group burned a number of churches 
in several cities, such as Ujung Pandang, Central Java, and Aceh. Christians 
responded by burning mosques in North Sulawesi and Ambon (Azra, 2002: 
213). Such tensions eventually made the World Council of Churches  in the 
1974 General Assembly Council canceled the meeting in Indonesia and moved 
it to Africa in 1975 (Azra, 2002: 213).
ISLAM IN THE ERA OF SOEHARTO (THE NEW ORDER)
When Suharto  became President of  Indonesia, there was a  glimmer of 
hope for political Islam, particularly among those who were banned during 
the Sukarno regime and resumed the fight for the return of Jakarta Charter to 
become the basis of the State. In fact, the rise of Suharto still did not bring a 
fresh breeze  of  political  Islamic groups  since  Soeharto  considered 
that  political Islam  could  threaten  his political policies.  Islam  was 
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considered to be  the latent  danger  of communism, so that  after the 
second  term,  there was a  pejorative  at that time  that said  “Communism  is 
the ‘extreme left’, whereas Islam is  ‘extreme right’” (Anwar, 2006: 766). This 
situation  brought  the relationship between political Islam  and the  New 
Order  Regime  (New Order)  to  a tension  as  that happened  in the  days 
of  Sukarno.  Although  political  Islamist groups  had  contributed  to fall  of 
communism and  advocated  the establishment of  a new Government,  the 
regime remained at its founding to marginalize them, as disclosed Natsir, one 
of the officials of the banned Masyumi who said that “the regime of the New 
Order treated us like ringworm cat” (McVey cited in Anwar, 2006: 767).
The tension between political Islam and Suharto during the New Order was 
not  completely static, because  in its development, Suharto  still  gave  room 
to accommodate Islamic political circles, namely by agreeing to the birth of a new 
party named Indonesian Muslim Party (Parmusi), which was the reincarnation 
of  Masyumi, through  Presidential Decree  on 30  March  1968.  However, 
in its development, Suharto seems to half-heartedly supported the existence 
of  this party, which was indicated by  his rejection of  the amalgamation of 
the  senior  figures  of the Masyumi into the  party.  To realize  his vision, 
Suharto intervened in the cancellation of the election of Mohammad Roem, a 
senior figure of Masyumi who was to become Chairman of the Parmusi and 
then offered another alternative figure considered more cooperative as a step to 
control the party. This event caused a massive split within the Parmusi (Hwang, 
2011: 72).
The  intervention  of the New Order regime  on the  Parmusi  resulted in the 
decrease of the party’s vote tally in the 1971 elections, in which it only gained 
5.4% votes, far below the result gained by the Masyumi in 1955 elections that 
managed to  garner  20.9  percent of the votes. Although  the overall  votes 
of the Islamic parties were merged (27.2%), they still could not beat the Gol-
kar which was Suharto’s main supporter  that  managed to reach  62.8% of 
the votes. Despite the fact  the combined  vote  tally  showed that the  Islam-
ic party  was still  far below the  Golkar, the  New Order regime  still  con-
sidered  presence  of Islamic  parties  as a threat to Suharto’s  political  poli-
cies. Therefore,  for the sake of restricting the growth of Islamic parties, the 
New Order regime  implemented a two  spearhead strategy, which support-
ed  personal  piety  and  Islamic  cultural  movement  on one hand but  on the 
other hand, opposed to the presence of political Islam in any form of politics.
To delegitimize  and  depoliticize  political Islam  in  Indonesia,  in 1971, the 
New Order regime decided to merge political party system. The fusion 
seccessfully dispersed  all  Islamic parties  (Parmusi, NU,  PSII,  and Perti), 
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which represented a relatively distinct ideology, under the flag of the United 
Development Party  (PPP), and the  secular-nationalist  and  Christian 
parties  under the Indonesian Democratic Party   (PDI).  In addition,  the 
New Order regime also confirmed  to  the parties  that  the it  had the 
right  to intervene  in  the election  the party leadership as well  as  the 
formulation of  party policy, so  that their presence  would not  bring  a 
threat to Golkar  that became  Suharto’s  political  vehicle  (Hefner, 2002: 
395).  Other  forms of intervention  against political parties, according 
to  Hwang  was  banning  any  party  to open  a branch in villages or hamlets, 
banning any party doing demonstrations or recruitment of cadres one month 
before the elections, banning the party from campaigning outside the campaign 
period,  and did not  allow the  competent  cadres  of political parties  to 
hold the  office  of  governor, mayor,  and head  of the village, except 
for Golkar cadres (Hwang, 2011: 73-74). On the contrary, with more power that 
justified all means, the New Order, in order to maintain control commanded the 
entire civil servants  to swear allegiance  to and vote for Golkar  in elections, 
because Golkar was considered the only state representation.
Ahead of the  elections in  1977, the New Order regime  played  a  political 
intrigue by using character assassination strategy against its rivals. The New 
Order accused the PPP as part of a group of secret radical Islamist called the 
Komando Jihad which intended to overthrow the Government. In addition, 
the regime also conducted numerous practices of intimidation, coercion, and 
restrictions  on  political parties  that were considered  to be  a rival  of 
Golkar. However, it did not entirely succeed because Golkar remained unable 
to  decrease  the PPP  vote  tally drastically.  So, in the 1977  elections,  the 
PPP  was still able to  collect  significant  votes  of  29.29%.  The 
delegitimization  efforts  against  political Islam  did not  just  stop 
there, ahead of the general elections of 1982, the New Order regime issued 
a  controversial  policy, which  set Pancasila  as  the sole basis for all political 
parties. As a result, each political party was required to abandon its ideology 
and replaced it with the Pancasila.
PPP was one of the victims of  the single basis of assignment. The PPP was 
forced to abandon the party’s ideological line of Islam because of the policies of 
the new order regime requires that the entire parties in the country should refer 
to a single principle. The symbol of the Kaaba in the PPP›s identity must also be 
converted into the sign of stars, which was one of the symbols in the Pancasila, 
because  the new order  also  prohibited the use of  Islamic  symbols  as 
a symbol  of the party. The use of  Pancasila  as  the sole  basis was  not 
only imposed on political parties, but also applied to civic organizations. One 
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of  the organizations  affected by  the outbreak  of  the application of  the sole 
principle was the Association of Islamic Students (HMI). Consequently, the 
HMI split into two groups in which HMI DIPO accepted a single basis policy, 
and HMI-MPO chose to maintain the Islamic identity in its statute secretly.
Essentially, the principle of Pancasila as the sole designation received a lot of 
criticism from Muslims because they assumed that Pancasila was created by 
humans so that it cannot be paralleled with the Quran which is the creation 
of God.  However,  the regime of New Order  anticipated  the opposition 
by banning and considering the whole discussion related to SARA (ethnicity, 
religion, race, and inter-group relations)  in order to create the mono-
loyalty  to  Pancasila.  To that end,  the New Order regime never  hesitated  to 
take hard measures against  those who resisted  the Pancasila and broke  the 
taboos about SARA. Many Muslim activists were arrested and jailed because 
they rejected the policies applied by the regime.
Based on the above facts, it can be said that the relationship between the Muslims 
and Suharto in the era of the ‹70s to the early ‘80s was less harmonious. However 
it cannot be  forgotten  that  the Suharto  era  saw the  golden age of  Muslim 
intellectuals  whose background was  santri (student of Islamic boarding 
school).  These Muslim  intellectuals  studied not only the  ‘yellow  books’ 
(religious books), but  also the  ‘white  books’ that come from the 
Western  tradition  of science  such as  sociology, anthropology, philology, 
etc.  Armed with  multi-disciplinary  sciences,  the  Muslim intellectuals with 
santri background resumed the idea of an Islamic State that once championed 
by  the Muslim  generations  before  them.  For them,  the  fight for social 
justice concerning the substance of Islam and Islamic ethics cultivation in the 
life of nation and State was much more important than merely a fight for Islam 
as a flag or symbol.
One of the prominent Muslim intellectuals at the time was Nurcholish Madjid 
(Cak  Nur).  Cak  Nur  was among  the golden  generation of  Muslims  in 
his days  who not only  mastered  the corpus of  classical  Islam, but was 
also  knowledgeable about  the tradition of Western thought.  It was from 
the traditions of  Western thought  that  Cak  Nur  learned about the ideas 
of  democracy,  pluralism,  and human rights, and synthesize  them with the 
teachings of  Islam  which  is universal in nature.  One of  famous theses  by 
Cak  Nur  was  “Islam,  Yes,  Islamic party, No.”  When  the  thesis  was put 
forward  by  CakNur,  Islamist parties  were almost  aligned  with  the religion 
of Islam  itself, so Muslims should support Islamic parties.  According 
to Cak Nur, it is irrational because in other parties, there are also Muslims. As 
an intellectual, Cak Nur felt compelled to explain to the people that Islam is 
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not an exclusive religion, rather  it is inclusive and capable of adapting to a 
variety of situations and conditions. According to him, the fight for Islam does 
not have to be through a political party, but there are still many other ways 
to do it, one of them by upholding social justice in everyday life.
The  thesis  put forward  by  Cak  Nur  was also  born  as a form of  his 
concern  over the weakness  within society of the Muslims, so they  are 
getting  left behind by  the times.  According to  Cak  Nur, Muslims are left 
behind because they are too busy thinking of things that lack of principle in 
religion, otherwise things that could bring the benefit tend to be ignored. He 
exemplified  the idea of  the establishing  an Islamic State  championed 
by  the Islamic parties  is no longer popular, because  there has been  a  gap 
between  expectations and  reality.  According to him,  the  Islamic  party 
cadres  who have been  championing  the idea of  an Islamic State  ‘have 
failed’ to show sympathy and positive image in the community because some 
of those  involved  in corruption scandal  (Madjid, 2008: 226-27). He offered 
an alternative that emphasizes the need for openness, freedom, progressiveness 
and creativity in thinking that is embodied in the concept of secularization, 
the idea  of  progress, and  intellectual  freedom,  so that Muslims could 
meet the coming era of modernization that requires rationality. Cak Nur said 
that  secularization  is not  intended as an  application of  secularism  and 
turns the Muslims to be secularists, but  it is meant to appreciate the values 
that should be worldly, and set the Muslims free from a tendency to orient 
themselves to the hereafter. Thus, the mental willingness to always examine 
the truth of a value should be among the characteristics of Muslims. Further, 
secularization is meant for fulfilling the task of human being a «Caliph of God 
on Earth». The function as a Caliph of God certainly should give room for the 
existence of human freedom to set and choose their own ways and actions in 
order to repair their life on Earth and provide a justification for the existence 
of human responsibility for the deeds before God (Madjid, 2008: 229-30).
Cak Nur further says that,
... the  idea of  progress  is  an open  mental attitude,  willingness  to accept 
and learn  the values (worldly)  from anywhere,  as long as they  contain  the 
truth.  So,  in line with the  intellectual  freedom, we  must be willing  to 
listen  to  ideas of  development of humanity to the highest possibility, and 
then choose which one according to the objectives that contain the truth. It is 
difficult to understand that Muslims are not open in their attitude, whereas the 
Holly Book affirms that they «must listen to ideas and follow the best”(Madjid: 
2008: 234).
In addition to the Cak Nur, other intellectual Muslims with santri background 
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that took part in  reforming  Islamic thought  in the  70s  and  80s  was 
Abdurrahman Wahid. Wahid  was known as  the grandson of  the founder 
of Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Hasyim 
Ashari, one of his  works  was  the reform of  Islam  in  Indonesia  is  helping 
to introduce the contemporary ideas, such as democracy, pluralism, and human 
rights in within the NU, including in the pesantren (Islamic Boarding School) 
which was the base for the movement of NU. The NU is often regarded as a 
conservative  and traditional Islamic organizations.  The openness displayed 
by the NU in adopting such contemporary ideas received complements from 
CakNur as the movement has shifted from traditional to modern.
When many  Muslims  have yet to  approve  a single  principle of  Panca-
sila, Wahid  andK.H.  Ahmad  Siddiq  in  the NU  Congress in 1984 deci-
ded to  take  a progressive  step to  accept Pancasila  as  the sole  basis.  De-
spite accepting Pancasila as the sole basis, Wahid chose not to bow to those 
in power. Instead, he appeared as a critic of Suharto’s authoritarianism. Mean-
while, in Wahid’s perspective, Pancasila is not a closed ideology as practiced 
by the New Order regime. The Pancasila however is a principle which contains 
universal ethical values and capable of accommodating and bridging existing 
pluralism  in  Indonesia.  In short,  in the hands of Wahid,  the NU organiza-
tion  quickly  transformed  into a  modern  organization that  is now widely 
known among the international community.
In addition to the Cak Nur and Wahid, in fact there were more prominent Muslim 
intellectuals who contributed to renewing Islamic thought in that era, in the 
framework of the modernization efforts of proclaimed by the New Order. Among 
them were  Harun  Nasution, M.  Dawam  Rahardjo,  Djohan  Effendi, 
Adi Sasono, Mansour Fakih, etc. (Azra, 1999: 52-53).
Towards the end of the 80s and early 90s, the political landscape in Indonesia was 
experiencing  a considerable  shift,  characterized by Suharto’s  good relations 
with Islamic organizations.  Soeharto had no choice because  he realized 
that  his power  was getting  increasingly  weaker  after  several military  elites 
left him.  They  left  Suharto  because they were not  pleased to see  the 
growing concentration of wealth in the family of Suharto’s circle. According 
to Hefner (2002: 395), an effort made by the regime to appease Muslims also 
could not be  separated  from the  awareness of  the  President›s  advisers  that 
saw the rapid rise of Islam in many Muslim lands, such as what happened in 
Algeria.  They were aware that it was time that the government  took into 
account  and accommodated  Muslims  in  power if  Soeharto wanted to 
to survive.
By the  early 90s, Suharto  finally  issued a  variety of  partial  policies  in 
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order to accommodate  the interests of  Muslims, such as  the establish-
ment of   Islamic  banks, construction of  mosques, expansion of Islamic 
courts,  issuance of the regulation on the national education system, support 
for the holding of a National Islamic festival, legalization of the use of head-
scarves  for  female  students  in schools,  and also supports  the establishment 
of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI).
ISLAM IN THE REFORM ERA 
After the fall of Soeharto from the Presidency in May 1998, a hope that new 
political wind would blow into this country began to emerge. In line with the spirit 
of  reform  that demanded  political  freedom and  openness,  Habibie  allowed 
the establishment of  new  political parties, new media,  new organizations, 
and various  other institutions  to strengthen  the  power of  civil society.  The 
policy was well received by the people  indicated by the high enthusiasm to 
found new political parties in order to channel their political aspirations and to 
participate in policy formulation in the future. Ahead of the 1999 elections, there 
were 48 new parties that took part in the elections, including several Islamic 
parties.
In the early era of the Reform, the Islamic parties again demonstrated their 
passion to fight for  the implementation of  the Jakarta  Charter  and the 
implementation of Islamic jurisprudence law as an alternative to the positive 
law in the country. Therefore, they took advantage of the momentum of the 
economic crisis at that time to offer Islamic solutions. During the campaign of 
the elections in 1999, several Islamic parties, such as the United Development 
Party (PPP), Justice Party (PK), and the Crescent Star Party (PBB), appeared 
with the agenda of applying Sharia law in Indonesia. Unfortunately, however, 
the dream of an Islamic party to apply Islamic jurisprudence remained a dream 
because the votes garnered by the Islamic parties  in 1999 elections reached 
only  17.8%, making  them difficult to  insist on  the implementation of  the 
Jakarta Charter in the amendment of the Constitution in the MPR General 
session in 2000.
In addition to  the emergence of  various  Islamic parties,  the Habibie  was 
era  also  marked by various  ‘radical’ Islamic organizations  such as 
Mujahideen  Council,  Hizbut Tahrir, Islamic Law Enforcement Committee 
(KPSI), etc.  which aimed  to  fight for  the establishment of  an Islamic 
State  in  Indonesia.  These  organizations  were heavily influenced by  Middle 
Eastern Islamic militancy paradigm (Nasir, 2007: 269). Despite the struggle 
of the enactment of the Jakarta Charter first championed by the Islamic political 
parties were deadlocked as a result of less significant votes they received in the 
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Parliament, it did not change the determination of ‘radical’ Islamic activists  to 
fight for their political aspiration. With the support of epistemic strength of 
the community, making them strong  and solid  in the  regional level, they 
discreetly fight for their big dream of establishing an Islamic State. After going 
through a long struggle, the ‘radical’ Islamic activists ultimately succeeded in 
reaching their goal in the form of the application of Islamic Sharia law in some 
areas in Indonesia, such as in Bulukumba, Aceh, Banten, etc.
After  Abdurrahman Wahid  was elected  as the new President  to re-
place Habibie, new hope  began to emerge especially with regard to 
Wahid’s  leadership  style  widely-known as  a progressive and demo-
cratic figure. Unfortunately, Wahid’s leadership was marked by bloody com-
munal conflicts happening in the name of religion, i.e. Islam-Christians, such 
as those in Poso and Ambon, Ternate. To cope with the communal conflict, 
Wahid tried  to hold peaceful  dialog  to offer a solution  by calling  the two 
parties in conflict, i.e.  Laskar  Jihad and  Laskar  Kristus.  However,  peace-
ful  dialog  solution  offered  was not  effective.  The Laskar  Jihad  through  its 
leader, Jafar Umar Thalib kept sending its members to Ambon to fight Chris-
tians because Talib claimed that its action is justified by the Sharia. Talib did 
not heed dialog solutions offered by Wahid, instead he criticized Wahid as his 
policies were considered unclear regarding how to end the massacres of Mus-
lims in the Maluku.
Wahid’s tenure was  also marked by  a variety of  radical  actions, such 
as  that  conducted by the  Islamic  Defenders  Front  (FPI).  The presence 
of FPI in Indonesia was a response to the increasing moral decadence following a 
pattern of  a  hedonist  lifestyle and  permissive  towards  sinful practice.  The 
FPI  emerged  to the surface and  positioned itself  as a ‘moral  police’  who  is 
in charge of  conducting  raids  to destroy  nightspots,  places 
that provide alcohol, gambling and prostitution, and hotels that hide unlawful 
practices. The members of the FPI also rallied to take to the streets to fight 
for  their aspirations  to uphold Islamic jurisprudence  and  urged  people  to 
eradicate immoral attitudes.
After his  impeachment  by Parliament,  Wahid›s position  as President  was 
replaced by Megawati, who was Vice President at that time. One of the issues 
when Megawati served as President was the rejection by some Islamic groups 
against her because according to textual interpretation of Sharia law, women 
are not allowed to become the leader of a country. However, Megawati was 
not discouraged from running her duties as the head of State. The issue of the 
leadership of women slowly faded upon the presence of Hasyim Muzadi who 
was the Chairman of the Governing Board of the Nahdlatul Ulama and also one 
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of the elite  scholars of  the National Awakening Party  (PKB) as Megawati’s 
prospective vice president in the  2004 election.  However,  Megawati’s lost 
to  Susilo Bambang  Yudhoyono (SBY)  and  Jusuf Kalla  (JK) in  the  general 
election because of the support votes from members of the NU were split after 
the  candidacy of  Salahuddin  Wahid  (younger  brother of Wabduraahman 
Wahid and was also an elite cleric of the PKB who ran for vice president along 
with Wiranto, and thus favoring the stronghold of SBY-JK.
SBY’s leadership era was marked by  the growing  radical  actions by  Islamic 
groups.  This resulted in the increasing  act of destruction  of  houses of 
worship and also physical violence against minorities, as experienced by the 
Ahmadiyah and Shi›ah. Many observers assumed that the weak characters of 
SBY’s leadership somehow contributed to those incidents, although  he 
came from a military background. Yudhoyono’s era was also marked by the 
growth  of radical action  carried out by  the Islamic movement.  Among the 
various Islamic organizations, the FPI was the one that most frequently drew the 
attention  of the public  because in  upholding  the  values  they observe,  the 
FPI  justified  vandalism, such as  sweeping  and damaging  facilities  of 
bars, discotheques, where localization and various other night entertainment 
venues, especially during the month of Ramadan. The FPI also often conducted 
sweeping  on the restaurants open  during the day  such as the incident of 
Coto Makassar in 2011.
In order to  enforce  their  version of  Islamic  understanding,  the members 
of  the  FPI  also halted  a wide range of  activities that are considered  as 
‘harassing’ Islam as they did in 2005 by attacking the Drag Queen show held 
at the  Sarinah Hotel and  dismissed  the event  of  the transgender  at  the 
Bumi Wiyata Hotel in Depok in 2010. They did not stop there. The members 
of  the FPI  also  damaged  the Government-owned  offices  in 2012  due to 
the cancellation of legislation on alcoholic drink. In short, the struggle of Islam 
in the Reform era has been generally marked by the growing radicalism under 
the name of religion (Islam).
CONCLUSION
Islam that was brought to Indonesia is unique since its spread patterns tend 
to lean  towards  Sufic  approach  so it can adapt easily to the  socio-cultur-
al condition of the community.  Very few  incidents were found  in the pro-
cess of  Islamization  in  Indonesia. On the contrary, the process of  Islamisa-
tion  of  Hinduism-Buddhism  to  Islam  tended to be  natural.  In fact,  among 
the scholars there is still a debate going on the time of the coming of Islam to 
the archipelago. However,  in general,  the process of Islamization developed 
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during the reign of  the King of Pasai  in Aceh who converted to Islam. Af-
ter that, Islam later spread to different wider regions of the archipelago, such 
as Java, Sulawesi, Maluku, etc. When Islam has become the religion of the ma-
jority, the colonizers assumed that Muslims were a real threat to their existenc
e in Indonesia. In colonial times, Muslims were highly respected by the coloni
zers. The invaders were aware of the strength of Islam because its followers had 
a strong solidarity, in addition to its teaching that teaches a revolutionary and 
anti-oppression through the doctrine of jihad.
After the  independence of  Indonesia, the relationship between  Islam  and 
the State tended to be  dynamic.  This happened because  the founding 
fathers  tended to have  a different  interpretation  on  the meaning of  the 
relationship  between Islam  and the State.  Among the  secular  nationalists 
(religious neutral nationalists) who agreed with the doctrine of the separation 
between  religion  and State  considered that the establishment of  an Islamic 
State  in  Indonesia  was no longer needed. The most important  was  to 
implement  Islamic  values and  ethics  as  a  spirit  in the  country.  In other 
words, the secular-nationalist circles were more likely to see Islam from the 
perspective of a more substantialist view. In contrast, the religious-nationalist 
assumed that  an Islamic State  is a country  that formally  makes  Islam  the 
basis of  the State and  also  as an alternative to  formal legality  against 
various other systems. The religious-nationalist circles in this case tended to 
be more formal. Although a bit allergic to political Islam, the State has never 
constrained the Muslims to practice the ibadah (worship) Islam (a term coined 
by Kuntowijoyo) or ritual Islam.
In the era of Suharto, the relationship between Islam and the State was similar to 
the time of Sukarno. In the early days of Suharto›s rule, Islam was considered to 
be a threat, thus came the pejorative term ‹extreme right›. However, the tensions 
between Islam and the State did not take place in a static but rather in a dynamic 
way. In the late 80s, a period in which Suharto’s power weakened, especially after 
he was abandoned by the military elites that stood behind him, he finally issued 
a variety of partial  and controversial policies  in order to accommodate  the 
interests of the Muslims that had significant influence to secure his power.
During the  time of  the Reform,  in the wake of  Suharto›s  fall, the 
political  landscape  in  Indonesia  turned out to be  more democratic, 
characterized by the existence of freedom of speech, opinion, and association. 
However,  the  sad  thing is that freedom  resulted from the Reform has 
sometimes been articulated negatively in the form of radical actions on behalf 
of religion (Islam). This, as a result, changed the image of Indonesian Islam 
from friendly Islam to angry Islam.
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